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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
I looked on it (the press) as a problem to be managed.  I did not look on the press 
as an asset, in doing what I had to do.  Maybe that’s just sort of the natural order 
of things between the government and the press.  But it was so important, 
especially in connection with the Gulf conflict, where the possibility existed of a 
long-term, sustained kind of operation where the stakes were enormous, I felt that 
it was important to try to manage that relationship in a way so the press didn’t 
screw us… 
—Richard  B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense during Desert Shield/Storm1 
 
I think that I was shaped, as much as anything, by Vietnam, and as far as the 
press/military relationship is concerned, I walked away with a very sour taste in 
my mouth, that something had gone badly wrong in that relationship. 
—GEN (Ret.) John Shalikashvili, Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff2 
 
These statements, from two senior U.S. defense officials, expose a bias, or 
predisposition against the news media (the press.)3  The purpose of this thesis is to 
research the evolution of this bias in general and to develop survey questions designed to 
identify root causes of this bias in junior military officers in particular.  
 The military is not alone here; bias exists on both sides of the military-media 
relationship.  While the military may appear to not understand the public’s expectations 
and information requirements in a democracy, many media personnel equally 
misunderstand the military culture and military concern for operational security.  Patrick 
Pexton, Reporter for The Navy Times explained, 
 
                                                 
1 From an interview conducted January 12th, 1995 by VADM (Ret.) William P. Lawrence and Frank 
Aukofer published in America’s Team; The Odd Couple—A Report on the Relationship Between the Media 
and the Military.   
2 From an interview conducted December 29th, 1994 by VADM (Ret.) William P. Lawrence and Frank 
Aukofer published in America’s Team; The Odd Couple—A Report on the Relationship Between the Media 
and the Military. 
3 The American news media encompasses printed journals, newspapers, news magazines, radio, and 
television.  Hereafter, the news media will simply be referred to as “the media.” 
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The military is intent on controlling information and worse, controlling the spin, 
the angle, far more than any politician I’ve ever covered.  I have had public affairs 
officers lie to me frequently and they seem to do so more as they rank higher in 
their careers.4 
 
The imperfect relationship between the military and the media during 1990-91’s 
Operation Desert Shield/Storm is illustrated in Figure 1.  As the cartoon depicts, the 
message that the military wanted the American public, and to some extent the enemy, to 
receive was pre-packaged, innocuous information designed to satisfy natural intellectual 
curiosity about the war effort, while maintaining the utmost operational security.  As 
exemplified earlier by Mr. Cheney, many senior military officers in Desert Shield/Storm 
still held the belief that the media were one of the principle reasons for the United States 
losing the Vietnam War and felt that if they could control the media, then they would not 
have to fear the massive public criticism that came after the 1968 Tet Offensive.   
 
 
Figure 1.   DOONESBURY © cartoon portraying military public affairs officer tactics 
during 1991 Persian Gulf War.5 
 
Meaningful, mutually beneficial relationships between the media and the military 
are vital to the existence of a democratic society. An adequately informed populace can 
more effectively communicate their desires to their elected officials but to be adequately 
                                                 
4 From comments submitted with survey conducted by VADM (Ret.) William P. Lawrence and Frank 
Aukofer published in America’s Team; The Odd Couple—A Report on the Relationship Between the Media 
and the Military. 
5 DOONESBURY © G. B. Trudeau.  Reprinted with permission of UNIVERSAL PRESS SYNDICATE.  
All rights reserved. 
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informed, the populace requires accurate information.  The U.S. population receives a 
majority of their information through the media; therefore it behooves the military to 
provide the public, through the media, with the most timely and accurate information that 
security will allow.  This thesis will provide a means of identifying factors that contribute 
to creating a bias in U.S. Navy officers against the media.  Once identified, these factors 
can be mitigated and, hopefully, the timely and accurate information necessary to 
maintaining a strong democracy will be available to the American public.   
 
B. AREA OF RESEARCH  
This thesis reviews several cases to highlight instances where the U.S. military 
have fallen short in terms of providing timely and accurate information to the American 
public and thereby aiding the creation of bias between the military and the media.  The 
American Civil War, World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, 
and Desert Storm help detail the maturation and decline of the military-media 
relationship. Two specific examples, the USS IOWA explosion and the USS 
GREENEVILLE collision with a Japanese fishing trawler, detail instances in which the 
U.S. Navy appears to have mishandled information in significant news events.  Although 
these instances were not associated with military operations with direct impact on U.S. 
national security, they highlight events that, when mishandled, contribute to biases that 
could have detrimental effects on future operations that do impact national security. 
Following the review, this thesis will introduce survey questions designed to 
identify any existing biases held by U.S. Navy officers against the media and, if biases 
exist, help identify the sources or factors contributing to their development. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
1. Primary Research Question 
Are U.S. Navy officers biased against the news media? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
a) What are criteria for measuring military-media bias? 
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b) Are there historical case studies that show a trend in this relationship? 
c) What are root causes of this bias?  
 
D. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
The thesis begins with an historical overview of the relationship between the 
military and the media.  This will show how media personnel have become integrated 
with military units to obtain information for publication.  It will also highlight some of 
the historical “ups” and “downs” in the military-media relationship, which are readily 
visible in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1.   Military-Media Relationships  (From: Moskos’s The Media and the Military in 
Peace and Humanitarian Operations)6 
Military-Media Variable Pre-Vietnam* Post-Vietnam** Operations Other Than War*** 
Attitude of military toward 
press Friendly Hostile Apprehensive 
Attitude of press toward 
military Friendly Skeptical Distant 
Access to military Part of unit Pools Intermittent 
Military control of media High Medium Low 
Focus on non-military entities, 
e.g. NGOs, inter-agencies, DoD, 
and contract civilians 
Low Medium High 
Media perception of military 
relationship Incorporated Manipulated Courted 
Media reliance on military for 
communications technology Totally Partially Independent 
When the story ends Shooting stops Troops go home Media go home 
* e.g. World War II, Korean War      **  e.g. Grenada, Panama, Gulf War      ***  e.g. Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia 
 
Table 1 keenly illustrates the warm relationship that was present before the 
Vietnam War, the low-point that occurred after Vietnam, and the general ambivalence 
that the military felt towards the media through and after Desert Storm.  The censorship 
                                                 
6 Moskos, Charles C.  The Media and the Military in Peace and Humanitarian Operations.  Robert R. 
McCormick Tribune Foundation: Chicago, IL, 2000, p 12. 
 5
that allowed a good relationship to foster during World War II was not present in 
Vietnam, and coupled with a generation of reporters that were more willing to question 
and criticize the war effort, the relationship between the media and the military suffered, 
and was illustrated during the Gulf War, as many of the young lieutenants of Vietnam 
were now the generals commanding the allied coalition.   
Noticing in Table 1 that when the media were incorporated (embedded) into 
military units, the relationship was generally good—the media were friendly to the 
military and vice versa—the relationship between today’s military and media may be 
coming around full circle.  In the current conflict in the Persian Gulf region, Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, media assets are embedded into military units, reporting action from the 
front lines, just as reporters had done in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam.  While the 
media are different, views of fighting being transmitted into American homes via satellite 
telephones, e-mail, and the internet, the bond that is being fostered by the media making 
the same sacrifices in the field, could possibly do much to finally mend the relationship 
between the media and military that was so badly broken during the Vietnam War and 
festered during subsequent conflicts (Grenada, Panama, and Desert Storm).  This thesis, 
through the implementation of a survey directed towards the Unrestricted Line Officers7 
(URL) in the Navy, will explore the status of the current military-media relationship. 
Secondly, two case studies will be examined in which the U.S. Navy seemed to 
mishandle the media and information during newsworthy events: the explosion aboard 
the USS IOWA in 1989 and the collision between the submarine USS GREENEVILLE 
and a Japanese fishing trawler in 2001.  The Navy, which historically has shown a 
tendency to shy away from the media when faced with potentially embarrassing news 
coverage8, dismally failed at keeping the public informed of developments in these cases, 
and subsequently, the American public received the editorialized versions from the 
media.  
                                                 
7 An Unrestricted Line Officer in the Navy are those officers who are eligible for command at sea (surface 
Warfare Officers, Aviators, and Submariners). 
8 Reed, Fred.  Navy Has Self to Blame for Bad Press.  Navy Times, September 12, 1988, p 78. 
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Finally, the thesis proposes a survey, briefly mentioned above, to identify bias 
against the media within the Navy’s officer corps. The survey questions were collected 
from the Triangle Institute for Security Studies Survey on the Military in the Post—Cold 
War Era and a survey commissioned by the Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation 
and conducted by the Gallup Organization in 1999 as part of the Catigny Conference 
Series. Data collected from this survey will support analysis to determine:  
1. Whether there is a bias in the U.S. Navy officer corps towards the media. 
2. When that bias, if it exists, develops in the course of an officer’s career? 
3. What other demographic factors might influence the bias? 
4. What efforts and courses of action can be taken to mitigate that bias and 
improve the Navy’s ability to adequately inform the U.S. public while 
maintaining appropriate operations security? 
The questions selected from the Triangle Institute’s survey will also collect 
demographic data from the survey respondents.  The questions developed by the 
McCormick Tribune Foundation will assess the existence of bias.   The 1999 Gallup poll, 
from which the majority of the survey questions were selected, limited military 
respondents to senior military officers (i.e., flag rank.)  This study will poll all of the 
officer ranks to identify if there is a correlation in demographics to the existence of bias. 
For the purpose of the survey, only Unrestricted Line Officers will be polled.  The 
Navy URL officer represents the demographic of Navy officials most sought by the 
media for information regarding military events, therefore, if a negative media bias exists 
in this demographic it is most likely to cause the information flow from the military to the 
public (through the media) to be corrupted. 
 
E. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
Although this thesis focuses on a single demographic within a single service 
(Unrestricted Line Officers in the U.S. Navy) the results provide a methodology 
applicable to all military and government branches as a means of identifying bias 
between the military and the media.  The media play a pivotal role in American society 
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and should be duly considered in all aspects of military planning.   The media are the 
primary conduit of information from the military to the public.  It is through this conduit 
that the public will see the military as competent defenders of U.S. national security or as 
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II. EVOLUTION OF MILITARY-MEDIA RELATIONSHIPS 
A. THE MEDIA AND THE MILITARY 
1. Introduction 
Historically, advances in communications, transportation and weapon systems 
have had profound impacts on military organization, strategy and doctrine. The evolution 
of mass communications through the 19th and 20th centuries is no exception.  Although 
the media and mass communications exist exclusive of the military, they impact the way 
militaries conduct operations.  This historical background will provide insight and 
perspective into the evolution of the military-media relationship and the implications of 
positive and negative biases between these entities.   
A noticeable rift has emerged between the military and the media since the 
burgeoning of mass media and speedy telecommunications.  The media bring the front 
lines of war to the homes of the American public in an effort to satiate the public’s desire 
to be informed.  The media view is that all available information should be provided to 
the public so they can make the best decisions.  The information provided by the media, 
however, is not only consumed by the American public but by both sides of the conflict.  
The military therefore disagrees with the media on what the public needs to know.  The 
military do not want all available information broadly disseminated and so appear to be 
hoarding the information the media wish to obtain.  Coupled with this is the apparent 
push by editors and other media ‘gateways’ to only pursue scandals and demeaning 
stories and this has caused a general bias amongst the military that the media is not on 
their side.9 
Despite these differences the media and the military co-exist and have had a long-
standing relationship.  The media have been instrumental in educating the public about 
the military and keeping them abreast of the role of the military in the realm of world 
politics and the furthering of American interests abroad.  However, the media are not 
being utilized to the fullest benefit by the military.   
                                                 
9 Ethiel, Nancy. 2000.  The Military and the Media: Public Perceptions.  Chicago, Ill.: Robert R. 
McCormick Tribune Foundation, p 55. 
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A rift between the military and the media prevents the military from reaching the 
public with its own story. Fostering a healthy and mutually understanding relationship 
with the media has big advantages for the military, so long as the media also appreciate 
and respect the necessity of national security and the effects their far-reaching message 
can have on strategy and operations.  The military-media relationship has been, for the 
most part, mutually beneficial.  In the United States, the First Amendment to the 
Constitution10 guarantees freedom of the press, yet during warfare it has always been 
necessary to limit this freedom for reasons of military secrecy and security. 
The noted war theorist Carl von Clausewitz states that popular support is a main 
factor in achieving strategic success on the battlefield.11  With the ability of the news 
media to keep the public immediately informed of events around the globe, popular 
support is more critical than ever for today’s military commanders.  To this end, both the 
news media and the officer corps of America’s military must do more to understand each 
other.  Recent trends in the media coverage of armed conflicts have shown a tendency for 
military commanders to either not understand the purpose of the news media in modern 
warfare or have not been prepared to utilize the media as a valuable resource in winning 
popular support at home. 
The following paragraphs will address the changing face of war brought on by 
mass communications and explore the maturation of the military-media relationship from 
the American Civil War to World War II, the pinnacle of a healthy military-media 
relationship.  This is followed by a look at the subsequent deterioration of that 
relationship starting in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts and continuing to the present 
day. 
                                                 
10 Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.  The Constitution of the United States of America 
As Amended. 106th Congress 2d Session, House of Representatives. Document No. 106-214. U.S. 
Government Printing Office Washington DC: 2000. P.13 
11 von Clausewitz, Carl.  1976.  On War.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p 363.  
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2. Changing the Face of War  
US military doctrine for Joint Operations describes new challenges that stem from 
the changing context for the use of force: 
Combatant commanders may confront a variety of factors that challenge the 
stability of countries and regions and threaten US national interests and security 
within their areas of responsibility.  These instabilities can lead to increased levels 
of competition, a wide variety of attempts at intimidation, drug trafficking, 
insurgencies, regional conflicts, weapons proliferation, and civil war.  It is 
difficult to predict which nations or groups may threaten US interests and 
how and when such threats will emerge.  Yet such predictions should be 
attempted, and with a process that allows for rapid dissemination of strategic 
estimates. 
When other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and 
informational) are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or 
protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct 
large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or 
protect national interests, placing the United States in a wartime state.  In 
such cases, the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, 
achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the 
United States and its multinational partners. 
Operations other than war are an aspect of military operations that focus on 
deterring war and promoting peace. 
Military operations other than war (MOOTW) involving the use or threat of 
force.  When other instruments of national power are unable to influence a 
deteriorating or potentially hostile situation, military force may be required to 
demonstrate US resolve and capability, support the other instruments of national 
power, or terminate the situation on favorable terms.  The general goals of US 
military operations during such periods are to support national objectives, deter 
war, and return to a state of peace.  Such operations involve a greater risk that US 
forces could become involved in combat than operations conducted to promote 
peace. 
Military operations other than war not involving the use of threat or force.  
Prudent use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions 
between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict and maintains 
US influence in foreign lands.  These operations, by definition, do not involve 
combat, but military forces always need to be prepared to protect themselves and 
respond to a changing situation.12 
Not long ago, threats to the United States’ national security could easily be 
generalized into the countries that made up the Communist Bloc (WARSAW PACT 
                                                 
12 Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations.  Executive Summary, p vii. 
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nations.)  With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the nature of national threats 
changed.  Previous doctrine was concerned with a possible massive Soviet invasion 
through the Fulda Gap in Europe; however, the threats to United States’ national 
objectives and interests in the post-Cold War era are ambiguous and regionally focused.  
Current American military doctrine refers to operations at the lower end of the 
spectrum of conflict as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). MOOTW 
require high levels of public support since the purpose for US involvement is sometimes 
vague.  Most people are not readily able to understand how, for instance, the inability to 
get humanitarian aid to a starving population is a US national objective (as in Somalia). 
 
Table 2.   Armed Forces in the Three Eras: The United States (From: Moskos’s The 
Postmodern Military)13 







Perceived Threat Enemy Invasion Nuclear War Subnational (e.g., ethnic violence, terrorism) 
Force Structure Mass army, conscription Large professional army Small professional army 
Major Mission 
Definition Defense of homeland Support of alliance 
New missions (e.g., peacekeeping, 
humanitarian) 
Public Attitude 
toward Military Supportive Ambivalent Indifferent 
Media Relations Incorporated Manipulated Courted 
Conscientious 
Objection Limited or prohibited Routinely permitted Subsumed under civilian service 
 
Table 2, illustrates the changes in threats, attitudes, and force structure with 
regards to the United States’ armed forces.  The trend of our forces is toward smaller and 
much smarter compositions, while the threat has become more complex and infers that 
the threat in any conflict can never be absolutely discounted.  Of special note are the 
attitudes of the civilian populace and the military media relationship.  The notice of the 
public’s once supportive attitude towards the military to their current feeling of 
                                                 
13 Moskos, Charles C.  The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War.  New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000. 
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indifference, supports the existence of a civil-military gap that was highlighted all the 
more by former Secretary of Defense William Cohen stating that: 
A chasm…developing between the military and civilian worlds, where the 
civilian world doesn’t fully grasp the mission of the military, and the military 
doesn’t understand why the memories of our citizens and civilian policy-makers 
are so short, or why the criticism is so quick and unrelenting.14  
 
The military-media relationship, as illustrated in Tables 1 and 2 and detailed in the 
following paragraphs, has been in a state of flux since the end of World War II.  World 
War II marked a high point and set the benchmark for a mutually supportive military-
media relationship.  Reporters were granted unfettered access to the troops on the front 
lines and commanders were comfortable with discussing the concepts of military 
operations with media personnel.  The commander’s knew that if the newsman 
inadvertently breached security in a report, the security review teams would intercept the 
dispatch prior to public dissemination.  While this was censorship - pure and simple - the 
trust that was built between soldiers and the media allowed the military to get their story 
out and for the media to sell theirs.  During the Vietnam conflict however, this structure 
and the good relationship broke down. 
In Vietnam reporters were still permitted access to the soldiers and battlefields, 
but the media felt they were being used as a conduit of misinformation distributed by the 
U.S. military and government to generate and maintain public support for the war.  
Following this breakdown in trust the military have tried to learn from the lessons of 
Vietnam, and have started to realize the importance and role of the media in society and 
the necessity of incorporating the media into all facets of combat operations. 
The poor planning by senior defense and government officials to incorporate the 
media into military operations only fomented the chasm that was created in Vietnam and 
marred conflicts after Vietnam.  Botched attempts at limited press pools and pre-
packaged media coverage of aerial bombardments during press briefings did little to 
satiate the media’s desire, and right, to keep the public adequately informed of the 
military’s performance. 
                                                 
14 Cohen, William.  From 1997 speech at Yale University. 
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3. Concept of Social Contract 
The rise of an urban industrial class at the outset of the Industrial revolution 
encouraged others to share in national and imperial glory.  British citizens were readily 
willing to abrogate their rights, including that of the free press, if it meant survival during 
war (as in the Battle for Britain in World War II.)   Western liberal democracies have 
held to the 19th century principle that describes the social contract to be “any [that] was 
designed to protect the nation was a ‘just’ war on both philosophical and religious 
grounds.  As such it was not to be challenged [from neither civilian nor government 
perspectives].”15   
This social contract still holds that it is the natural duty of the citizen and the 
media (being made up of citizens) to rally in defense of what is claimed to be the 
common interests of security and survival of a state in any conflict.  This tenant is 
demonstrated repeatedly in historical review of the military-media relationship in the next 
section.  The question then becomes whether this contract will carry through to future 
conflicts or if a transformation in the social contract is inevitable.  The review of the past 
should provide a hint of the roadmap for the future. 
 
B. A HISTORY IN REVIEW 
1. Early Wartime Reporting: 1850-1865 
One of the first professional war correspondents, William Howard Russell of the 
London Times, demonstrated the inherent power and problems in modern day war 
reporting and is credited with being the first war correspondent to influence events on the 
battlefield as well as on politics.16  Russell recorded the incredible hardships of troops in 
the long siege before Sebastopol.  He chronicled the ill-preparedness and poor equipment 
of troops as well as the suffering they endured at hospitals.  He was the first to foray into 
the gray area of operational security – specifically, the problem of determining the 
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difference in reporting news versus jeopardizing operational security during combat 
operations.   
Russell was a pioneer in bearing the brunt of official displeasure when breaking 
unwelcome news.  This period saw the rise of war reporting censorship by the 
government.  Military commanders allied with journalists for the career benefits of both 
parties and the glory of having their exploits publicized.  Journalists benefited by being 
privy to exclusive news stories and being afforded the opportunity to further their careers 
and military commanders were able to achieve fame by having accounts of battles 
recorded in print.   
2.   The First American War Correspondents: The American Civil War 
Military coverage of the American military began with about twenty reporters on 
hand for the First Battle of Bull Run on July 21, 1861, and saw those gathered 
correspondents fleeing with the Union Army.17  The advent of the telegraph saw that 
information could be transferred faster than ever before and sparked fears that the 
information might be transferred to the enemy.  An unabashed press hater, General 
William Tecumseh Sherman, said he would willingly agree to give half his pay to have 
his name kept out of the newspapers, and he took all the steps he could to try to prevent 
correspondents from traveling with him, including the threat to treat them as spies.18 
Moreover, the improvement or introduction of communications, photography, newspaper 
production and distribution saw an increase in information distribution and a public 
appetite for war reporting.  As a result, it did not take long for antagonism to develop 
between the American military and media.  With an increasing appetite for current news 
from the front lines of battle, correspondents were increasingly under pressure from their 
editors to provide up to date news stories to increase circulation.  However, with the 
possibility of being fired for not sending in any news, fabricated stories were not 
uncommon, and correspondents’ dispatches to editors “were frequently inaccurate, often 
invented, partisan, and inflammatory.”19 
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The most significant precedent to be set during the Civil War was formalized 
censorship and the implementation of the issuance of daily war bulletins.  With many of 
the telegraph portals near the front lines under military control, censorship of 
correspondents’ dispatches to their respective organizations became the norm, and when 
in 1864 the War Department began issuing daily war bulletins, the military was able to 
exercise control over the press, a practice still evident with today’s news briefings staged 
by senior Department of Defense officials.20 
3. Golden Age of War Reporting: 1865-1914 
The years from 1865-1914 were labeled as the "Golden Age" of defense 
reporting.21 The leading publications followed the profitable economic trail of war 
reporting based in the sure knowledge that war generated circulation.22 This was also a 
period that saw technology develop, enabling reporters to spread their news farther and 
better through advances in cable communications, photography, and early 
cinematography.23  Subsequently, an increase in the impetus of getting the story to the 
public sacrificed the accuracy and quality of reporting. 
4. The Great War of 1914-1918: Under the Guise of Patriotism 
 
Figure 2.   DOONESBURY © cartoon depicting press coverage during 1991 Persian Gulf 
War.24                                                  
20 Moskos, Charles C.  The Media and the Military in Peace and Humanitarian Operations.  Robert R. 
McCormick Tribune Foundation: Chicago, IL, 2000, p 18. 
21 Knightley, Phillip. The First Casualty.  Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: New York, NY, 1975, p 42. 
22 Knightley, Phillip. The First Casualty.  Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: New York, NY, 1975, p 23. 
23 Knightley, Phillip. The First Casualty.  Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: New York, NY, 1975, p 42. 
24 DOONESBURY © G. B. Trudeau.  Reprinted with permission of UNIVERSAL PRESS SYNDICATE.  
All rights reserved.  A ‘unilateral’ is a news correspondent who ventured into the battle zone without a 
military escort, outside of the press pool. 
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During World War I the relationship between the military and the media 
continued to come together, as policies were implemented to incorporate the media into 
military operations.  Members of the press, after being accredited by the War 
Department, were issued uniforms and given the honorary status of captain. The reporters 
identified with the soldiers and not surprisingly, they painted senior military officials and 
commanders in favorable light.25 
Despite the progress that came with the incorporation of the media into military 
operations, standards of censorship and access were also taken to new levels.  President 
Woodrow Wilson’s Committee on Public Information asked newspapers to refrain from 
printing “advance reports about troop strengths, troop and ship movements, anti-aircraft 
defenses and harbor defenses.”26  Congress enacted some of the most severe restrictions 
to prevent publication of information that could offer aid to the enemy or interfere with 
American military operations or war production, as well as forbidding critics of the 
United States government or American military forces.27   Figure 2, a cartoon depicting a 
public Affairs Officer in the Gulf War, satirizes the extremes that militaries go to 
maintain operational security.  This overzealous nature on the part of the United States 
military would later prove detrimental to the relationship between the military and the 
media, as the media felt that they were not being granted reasonable access to front line 
soldiers. 
5. World War II: The High Point of the Military-Media Relationship 
World War II set the benchmark for relations between the media and the military.  
Much like the current conflict in Iraq, the media were embedded into front line units and 
a symbiotic relationship was fostered.  Reporters were immersed into soldiers’ daily 
routines and mutual trust allowed for candid conversation between soldiers and the 
media, while set guidelines, and censors if needed, prevented reporters from dispatching 
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information that could harm the war effort.  In some instances, reporters stood up for 
military censorship, such as when Associated Press (AP) correspondent, Edward 
Kennedy, prematurely reported the German Surrender at Reims, France on May 7, 1945.  
Having broken an agreement with Army public relations to withhold news of the 
surrender as condition to his inclusion in the small press pool detailed to cover the 
surrender, he subsequently lost his accreditation and was ultimately fired by AP.  
Kennedy’s peers ultimately sided with the military, condemning his efforts to violate the 
rules and guidelines of the press pool to obtain his scoop.28  Additionally, the patriotism 
that was characteristic of the nation during World War II was prevalent in the media 
corps and subsequently contributed to a very positive military-media relationship.  
The patriotic fervor that engrossed the nation and led to unprecedented war 
production by any nation also rallied the media in support of the Allied cause.  During 
this time, the United States government set up two parallel agencies to deal with public 
information.  These organizations served to check and balance each other —the Office of 
War Information, which helped to publicize the war effort on the home front, and the self 
explanatory Office of Censorship.29  Just as in World War I, the federal government 
accredited correspondents in theater, basically meaning that the reporters agreed to 
censorship.   
Censorship was almost absolute in World War II; most journalists understood the 
undermining principle behind censorship, which was to not offer the enemy any 
information that could be harmful to the Allied war effort.  This censorship enabled a 
more open relationship between military officials and correspondents.  Because all 
reports were subject to military review before being dispatched, officers felt free to 
discuss sensitive materials with reporters, knowing that their frankness and candor could 
help the newsman tell the story, without compromising the war effort.30  
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As during World War I, the American media in World War II identified with the 
soldiers and their cause.   Often enduring the same conditions as the troops, the media 
felt, and the feeling was reciprocated, that they too were making a sacrifice to keep the 
American public informed and energized about the war effort.31 Unique to World War II 
were special combat correspondents, which debuted during this war.  These volunteers, 
typically journalists before the war, enlisted in the military and attended regular Marine 
training, after which they would participate or observe military action, to be processed for 
release by the Navy Department.32   
Technology was also a driving factor in coverage of the military during this time.  
Radio brought the front lines of battle into American homes faster than ever.  However, 
much as the military controlled the telegraph stations near the front lines during the Civil 
War, they also had control over the communications equipment through which 
correspondents submitted their stories.  Consequently, many news reports were 
dispatched back home in a neutral voice, which could be carried by many different news 
organizations and outlets. This was a precursor to the press pools that would be 
implemented in the 1980s.  
6. The Korean Conflict: The Military-Media Relationship in Flux 
Just five years after the end of World War II, the United Nations began a police 
action on the Korean Peninsula to thwart the invasion of communist forces from North 
Korea into its southern neighbor, South Korea.33  What made the Korean War different 
from its predecessors was that at the outset of the war, no censorship was imposed on the 
news media, and they were free to write and dispatch their stories so long as they 
voluntarily censored themselves, based on their own guidelines,34so long as their 
reporting would not deteriorate morale or cause embarrassment to the United States or its 
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allies.35  As in World War II, reporters were granted unfettered access to the front lines, 
as they were integrated into units, and were able to report back to the American public 
the real experiences of war, both the innocuous and the horrific.  
The freedom that journalists enjoyed in reporting news on the war in Korea began 
to fade away relatively quickly.  Within a month of the war’s onset, General Douglas 
MacArthur was calling on the correspondents to understand their role in psychological 
warfare with the enemy.36  With the ground rules already vastly different from their 
previous experiences (full censorship during WWII), the news media found themselves 
wishing that full censorship would be imposed so as to have established firm guidelines 
by which they could report.  With a war that was not going as smoothly as anticipated, 
the voluntary code under which reporters censored themselves came to include any 
criticism of the United Nations’ military commanders and the conduct of Allied soldiers 
in the battlefield.37   
When the United Nation Forces began to push through North Korea and up to 
Chinese Manchuria the military situation drastically changed.  Chinese ground troops 
were committed to support the North Korean troops and the UN forces began to get 
pushed back across the 38th Parallel.  With the war effort not going so well for the U.N., 
the feeling amongst the military commanders was that the fewer news correspondents 
around—the better.  MacArthur’s press chief even went so far as to make the media’s 
living accommodations and their ability to dispatch stories difficult so as to discourage 
their presence.38 
The voluntary censorship imposed upon the news media in Korea ultimately 
resulted in some operational security leaks, but it was the criticism of the war effort that 
finally brought forth the Department of Defense imposing censorship on the media.  
Censorship, when finally imposed, went well beyond the scope of operational security, 
preventing stories that might deplete morale or cause embarrassment to the United 
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Nations’ forces.39  With full censorship now in place, and the UN forces up against 
China—a more formidable enemy than North Korea—the military began micro-
managing the media coverage and sent the relationship between the news media and the 
military into a tailspin. 
As the war dragged on, and with no apparent progress being made by either side, 
the press began to step back from front line coverage and examine the morality and 
purpose of the war.  When South Korean soldiers did not seem to want to fight when 
faced with battle many began asking whether Korea was even worth saving.40  Wanting 
to ask the hard questions about war and its purpose, the media’s reports began to irritate 
the military and political leaders and tested the extent of their reporting freedoms. 
7. Vietnam: The Low Point in the Military-Media Relationship 
Whereas World War II marked a high point in the military-media relationship, the 
trend that was started in the Korean War, with the correspondents covering the conflict 
beginning to question the morality of wars obscured by political mire, carried over into 
the Vietnam war, and culminated in the low point in the military-media relationship.  
Correspondents were granted unfettered access to the military and were never subject to 
censorship during the course of the war.  The military, however, while trying to win the 
hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people, fell miserably short of winning the hearts and 
minds of the people back in the United States as well as those of the Vietnamese. 
The political situation that precipitated United States involvement in Vietnam 
created a different story line than what was present in World War II.  Hitler’s quest to 
conquer Europe created a clear and decisive distinction between good and evil.  Under 
the premise of stopping the spread of communism and containing China, the United 
States came to the aid of France and supported the Diem government in South Vietnam, 
hoping to preserve the French colonial aspirations in Indochina. 
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At the outset of the war, many correspondents were convinced, just as the military 
leadership was, that the war could be won and that it was being fought for a justifiable 
cause—to prevent the spread of communism.  But Vietnam was a different kind of war 
that required a different kind of reporting than that conducted in past wars.  “It was an 
interdisciplinary war, where complex political issues intruded on the military aspects, 
where battle success was necessary but where battle success alone was insufficient, a war 
where unwarranted optimism, propaganda, and news management could deeply obscure 
the issue.”41  As the war dragged on the military leadership was unable to convince the 
media, and ultimately the American public, that the war effort was working.  The media 
began to report the war as it was being played out—complete with details of corruption in 
the Diem government, accounts of atrocities carried out by United States military forces, 
and stories of suffering by innocent Vietnamese. 
The low point in the military–media relationship came when military leaders 
began to blame the media for the United States losing the war.42  Vice President Spiro 
Agnew even pleaded with the media to “get on side”43 with the United States, however, 
by that time the relationship with the media was already irreconcilably damaged.  During 
World War II, the military enjoyed the patriotic fervor that engrossed the nation and the 
media, however, as mentioned earlier, the Vietnam War was never established as a clear 
case of good vs. evil as WWII had been, and most of the American public started to 
question the purpose the United States’ involvement.  The Tet Offensive, in which the 
North Vietnamese launched a massive attack into major cities in South Vietnam, along 
with the mounting stories of American atrocities, began to sway public opinion.  
Additionally, the correspondents reporting on the war were younger44 and more apt to 
question policy and strategy than the media in prior wars. Presidents Lyndon Johnson and 
Richard Nixon supported the claim that reporters who were opposed to the war used their 
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freedom (from censorship) to publish negative stories about the war effort, which 
ultimately contributed to the United States’ defeat.45    
When the story of the My Lai Massacre, in which members of C Company, First 
Battalion, Twentieth Infantry, Eleventh Brigade, Americal Division, entered the village 
of My Lai and killed between ninety and 130 men, women and children on March 16th, 
1968, broke in late 1969, it also provided a catalyst to the growing American sentiment 
that the war was no longer just.  Prior to My Lai, many editors, although being provided 
accounts of atrocities in country, would refuse to publish those stories so as to be seen as 
being on side with the American war effort.  After the My Lai story broke, however, 
media gatekeepers were no longer inhibited about publishing damning, yet accurate, 
accounts of the war effort.46 
The media undoubtedly played a major role in the outcome of United States’ 
involvement in Vietnam, but was not the reason the United States came away from 
Vietnam with an embarrassing defeat.  Poor political and military strategy, which is now 
easily visible in hindsight, were the culprits.  Despite the benefit of historical review, 
many military leaders of the Vietnam era fostered a deep resentment towards the media.  
Unfortunately, that legacy carried over into the generations who fought the wars after 
Vietnam.47 
8. War Coverage in the 1980’s: Grenada and Panama 
Not wanting to duplicate the mistakes made during the Vietnam War with regards 
to media coverage, the 1980s brought numerous Department of Defense directives aimed 
at providing the media access to military forces in wartime.  While ensuring access is 
provided to the news media was historically the role of Public Affairs Officers (PAO), 
the sight of correspondents in the field in Vietnam was so routine that military officers 
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did not have to incorporate media plans into their operations48, guidance from the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed Combatant Commanders to 
incorporate effective public affairs efforts as part of each military operation.49 
Many of the Generals in the 1980s were products of the Vietnam War who felt 
that the news media were partly to blame for the United States’ loss. General 
Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has even remarked that in 
regards to blaming the media for the United States’ defeat in Vietnam: 
Youngsters are probably doing it, too.  I haven’t given it much thought, but I 
would think that they’re doing it as a kind of a reflection on what they hear from 
some of their elders.  You know, real men don’t talk to the press…50 
The prevailing sentiment of senior military officers was that the handling of the media 
was the job of the PAOs.51   When the Reagan Administration ordered the military to 
invade Grenada in 1983, these same officers failed to incorporate the JCS directives on 
media relationships into their battle plans, instead thinking that the status quo in Vietnam 
still held true in 1983, and the military failed to get the story out to the American public. 
The media had changed in many ways since the Vietnam War, both in size and 
the diversity in means to cover the news.  After US forces invaded the island nearly 600 
reporters converged onto Barbados to cover the war.52  However, not having planned for 
media involvement, either intentionally or unintentionally, reporters were not granted 
access to the island until the third day of the battle and missed most of the decisive 
action.  General Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, considered the exclusion 
of the media in this operation from the beginning to be a “huge mistake at the national 
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level.”53  The perceived deception and control of the media at high levels of the military 
and government, while not readily apparent to the public since Grenada marked the 
United States’ return to victorious warfare, was made all the more prevalent when Deputy 
White House Press Secretary, Les Janka resigned and accused the Reagan Administration 
of being nothing more than: 
A PR (public relations) outfit that became President and took over the country. 
And to the degree then to which the Constitution forced them to do things like 
make a budget, run foreign policy and all that, they sort of did. But their first, last, 
and overarching activity was public relations.54 
 
Janka’s resignation highlighted the fact that the military had yet to get over the loss in 
Vietnam and still fostered the feeling that the press was to blame, instead of poor strategy 
and policy, for the America’s losing war effort. 
By not planning for the media’s involvement the military leaders prevented the 
American public from understanding the purpose, let alone keeping abreast of the 
progress of the war.55  Thus, following Grenada, General Vessey appointed a commission 
to study military-media relations. The panel was composed of active-duty military 
officers and retired journalists. Retired Major General Winant Sidle, for whom the panel 
and its report were named, headed it. The establishment of press pools was the key 
recommendation of the Sidle Report and the most controversial. The media panel 
members agreed with its basic recommendation:  
 
When it becomes apparent during military operational planning that news media 
pooling provides the only feasible means of furnishing the media with early 
access to an operation, planning should support the largest possible press pool that 
is practical and minimize the length of time the pool will be necessary.56 
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The failed media effort in Grenada led to the establishment of the DoD National 
Media Pool.  While the intention was to make it easier for the media to gain access to the 
front lines of battle, the corps of officers at the top, still heavily influenced by the 
Vietnam War, again thought that the press pool would just alleviate their responsibility 
and tasking of incorporating the media into military operations, as demonstrated during 
the invasion of Panama in 1989.57 Attitudes finally began to change about the importance 
of the media in military operations when General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, disseminated a message to the combatant commanders stating,  
Commanders are reminded that the media aspects of military operations are 
important…and warrant your personal attention.  …Media coverage and pool 
support requirements must be planned simultaneously with operational plans and 
should address all aspects of operational activity, including direct combat, 
medical, prisoner-of-war, refugee, equipment repair, refueling and rearming, civic 
action, and stabilization activities.  Public Affairs annexes should receive 
command attention when formulating and reviewing all such plans.58  
 
9. The Gulf War 
The Gulf war, although fought as many previous conventional wars, provided a 
theater for the use of the stockpile of technical weaponry that had amassed through the 
latter stages of the Cold War.  Just as the war effort was technologically advanced so was 
the reporting. The battlefield, complete with sound and images, was beamed directly into 
American homes.  While the number of journalists covering wars had been steadily 
increasing over time, the Gulf War was a benchmark for media coverage:  
On the eve of the ground war, over 1,000 aggressive reporters were 
anxious to get to where the action would be.  This compares with 27 
reporters who went ashore with Allied troops in the landing in Normandy, 
or the no more than 70 reporters who were at the front at one time during 
the Korean War.  Only about 400 reporters were accredited during the 
height of the Vietnam War, of whom only about 10 percent were ever in 
the field at any given time.59 
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The Gulf War saw a resurgence of the press pool, which was implemented with 
limited success, in the 1980s prior to the United States’ Operation Just Cause in Panama 
in 1989.  Escort officers would take groups of five correspondents out into the field60, 
and grant them limited access to operations.  While good in theory, the press pool system 
showed limitations on wartime reporting.  Soldiers in the field were not permitted to talk 
to reporters without an escort officer present, which was contrastingly different than the 
relationship reporters shared with soldiers in the field during World War II and to some 
extent—Vietnam, and the media ended up receiving most of their information content 
from staged press briefings, highlighting the military’s ability to control the information 
getting back to the American public.61 
 
Figure 3.   DOONESBURY © cartoon satirizing political correctness spin at press pool 
briefing.62 
 
While correspondents were no longer reliant on the military to provide the means 
to transmit their stories back home, pre-packaged information from military press 
briefings and the assignment to press pools with escort officers did seem to paint the 
military’s role in the relationship with the media as manipulative.  As mentioned before, 
soldiers were forbidden from talking to reporters without the presence of an escort 
officer, and the media often felt that the pool system was a Pentagon apparatus used to 
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61 Moskos, Charles C.  The Media and the Military in Peace and Humanitarian Operations.  Robert R. 
McCormick Tribune Foundation: Chicago, IL, 2000, p 24. 
62 DOONESBURY © G. B. Trudeau.  Reprinted with permission of UNIVERSAL PRESS SYNDICATE.  
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purposely keep the media away from the action and control media coverage.63  Figure 3, 
a Doonesbury cartoon from February 1991, depicts the military’s manipulation of the 
media by preventing them access to the front lines under the veil of operational security.  
While the images at home were packed with plenty of “gee-whiz” images to satiate the 
public’s desire for news from the front, the media were left with the feeling that they the 
media coverage of the Gulf War was not as good as it could have been.64 After the war, 
the Ad Hoc Media Group submitted a letter to the Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney 
that stated: 
We believe that the Pentagon Pool arrangements during Operation Desert Storm 
made it impossible for reporters and photographers to tell the public the full story 
of the war in a timely fashion.  We believe it is imperative that the Gulf war not 
serve as a model for future coverage.65 
 
 
Figure 4.   DOONESBURY © cartoon depicting press coverage during 1991 Persian Gulf 
War.66 
Figure 4 illustrates the media’s growing scrutiny of the military’s control over the 
media that were in country to cover the war.  As in past wars, reporters needed to be 
                                                 
All rights reserved. 
63 Halloran, Richard.  Soldiers and Scribblers: Working with the Media.  Parameters, Vol. 25, No. 2, 
Summer 1995, pp 151-160. 
64 Aukofer, Frank and William P. Lawrence.  America’s Team; The Odd Couple—A Report on the 
Relationship Between the Media and the Military.  The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center: 
Nashville, TN, 1995, p 45. 
65 Letter to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Ad Hoc Media Group, 25 June 1991. 
66 DOONESBURY © G. B. Trudeau.  Reprinted with permission of UNIVERSAL PRESS SYNDICATE.  
All rights reserved.  A ‘unilateral’ is a news correspondent who ventured into the battle zone without a 
military escort, outside of the press pool. 
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credentialed, and in order to have access to the front line soldiers, the reporters were 
taken to the front in pools.  A ‘unilateral’ was a reporter from outside of the press pool 
who would venture off into the desert without a military escort officer in search of a 
newsworthy story.  While the brunt of the satire is directed towards military public 
affairs, a certain bit of humor can be found in the suggestion of the competitiveness and 
infighting amongst the journalists to get original stories back to their editors. 
 
C. THE ROLE OF NEWS MEDIA IN TODAY’S MILITARY AND SOCIETY 
The media have, since the beginning of the United States, been a crucial element 
of American society.  They serve many purposes but mainly they keep the public 
informed of local, regional, national and international happenings, as well as serve as a 
watchdog for the American public.  While some may argue to what extent the media 
should question the government, especially in time of war, the media do serve a valuable 
role in American society, helping to ensure the rights and freedoms of Americans are 
protected by providing information on actions that would threaten these ideals.  A recent 
ABC News survey67 found that nearly 90% of Americans say that a free press is either 
‘very important’ or ‘essential’ to them, going further to say that the media should work 
mainly to question rather than to support the government.  However, during a time of war 
nearly two thirds of the people polled said that the government has the right to prevent 
the media from reporting information that may divulge military or operational secrets.  
Looking back to public perceptions during the last big American war, a 1991 Gallup 
survey found that four out of five Americans believed that military censorship was a 
“good idea.”68 
Just as the Gulf War illustrated new methods of bringing the front lines of battle 
to the American (and international) public, technology is making the public thirstier than 
ever for up-to-the-minute news coverage.  The rise of 24 hour a day cable news stations69 
and news outlets based on Internet technology have connected the public to all corners of 
                                                 
67 This survey was conducted on January 12th, 2003 and can be found in its entirety in Appendix C. 
68 Fialka, John.  Hotel Warriors: Covering the Gulf War.  Woodrow Wilson Press: Washington DC, 1992, 
pp 61-62. 
69 Fox News, MSNBC, CNN, etc. 
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the globe, and created a need to feed information to the public.  As illustrated as far back 
as the Civil War and Spanish-American War70, wars sell newspapers, and in today’s case, 
garner television viewers and hits on Internet websites. 
The ABC News Survey poses a very good question— To what extent should the 
media have access to and report on military operations?  “In recent years, the tendency to 
formulate U.S. foreign policy with little or no formal debate between the administration 
and the Congress has left a vacuum that the media has rushed to fill.”71   The need for 
operational secrecy as well as the requirement to keep the public informed is a delicate 
balance that, when mishandled, can send the military-media relationship into a disastrous 
tailspin much like the aftermath of the Vietnam War.  However, in the United States the 
press serves as the first guarantor of our most basic civil rights, and thus has the 
responsibility to question the matching of policy to strategy, which is in direct contrast to 
the sentiments expressed in the ABC News survey.  Supporting the ABC survey findings, 
a recent study conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, found 
that only 49% of the people polled thought that the media were patriotic, with 35% going 
further to state that the media were too critical of the country.72 
More recently, in preparation for impending conflict with Iraq, the press pools of 
the 1990s have been abandoned in favor of the embedded reporter, similar to the days of 
Vietnam, “when reporters traveled with front-line troops.  The Pentagon is expected to 
allow about 500 reporters to “embed” with various fighting units—living with and 
reporting on them from deployment right into battle and back home again.”73  Self 
imposed guidelines, such as those used in Korea and Vietnam, are being used in 
conjunction with new rules—which are a result of the improvements in 
telecommunications and enemy capabilities to geo-locate electronic emissions.  
                                                 
70 When William Randolph Hearst instructed his reporter to stay in Cuba because if he would furnish the 
pictures, Hearst would furnish the War.  Quoted in Knightley’s The First Casualty, p 56.  
71 Porch, Douglas.  No Bad Stories: The American Media-Military Relationship.  Navy War College 
Review, Winter 2002. 
72 News Media’s Improved Image Proves Short-Lived: The Sagging Stock Market’s Big Audience.  The 
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. August 4, 2002. http://people-
press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=159 (March 2003) 
73 Johnson, Peter.  Reporters Have Own Rules of War,  USA Today, February 16, 2003.  
http://www.usatoday.com/life/2003-02-17-war-sidebar.htm (March 2003)  
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Embedding reporters with military units will allow mutual trust to foster between soldiers 
and reporters and allow the American public to experience the sacrifices made by their 
soldiers, airmen, and sailors. 
To what extent should the media have access to and report on military operations?  
History and experience help draw the conclusion that the media are essential to military 
operations so as to add validity and justness to the military operation in and of itself.  
Without the media present on the battlefield, the only story that would reach the 
American public is that of the governments.  While the American government 
undoubtedly prides itself on being the beacon of democracy and number one provider and 
enforcing authority of civil rights, without the checks and balance provided by the media, 
rampant mistrust by the American public would be sure to plaque reports that are solely 
provided by the military.  Hence, the media are a necessity during wartime, as well as all 
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III.  MILITARY-MEDIA RELATIONSHIP DEBACLES 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
The Navy, as well as the other services, must embrace the fact that negative press 
is inevitable.  The challenge is to not allow negative attitudes toward the Navy to become 
the norm.  Being prepared to counter negative press can go a long way towards 
alleviating any long-term side affects from tarnishing the military’s image. 
The difficulty encountered by the military when dealing with this target set, 
peoples’ attitudes, is that these organizations are accustomed to engaging tangible objects 
and not the intangible aspects of the human mind.  While tangible targets such as tanks 
and radar facilities can easily be targeted and destroyed, the attitudes of people are not 
objects that can be destroyed.  Attitudes are developed from information and that 
information can be fact or fiction.  The American ideal of a free press and prevalence of 
the media help guarantee that the facts will be discovered despite the presence of fictional 
information.  The previous chapter examined the relationship between the American 
military and the media during times of war.  For the most part, with Vietnam being the 
obvious exception, the military has had a good working relationship with the media 
during wartime.  There have definitely been some instances in which media access to the 
military was less than ideal, with Grenada and Panama being recent examples, however, 
the story presented was, for the most part, favorable to the military. 
Looking at the ABC News poll74, in wartime, 56% of the people polled stated that 
the media should support the war effort, with only 36% feeling that the media should 
question the war effort.  In general (during times other than war), the poll states that 58% 
of the people polled felt that the media should question the government, with only 25% 
stating that the media should support the government no matter what.75  These polls are 
consistent with the historical trends presented in earlier chapters and provide reason for 
the perceived bias in the military towards the media.  While military coverage during 
                                                 
74 This survey was conducted on January 12th, 2003 and can be found in its entirety in Appendix C. 
75 13% reported that it depended on the subject. 
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wars most often casts favorable light upon the military, the stories that grace the 
headlines during peacetime are often much to the military’s chagrin.  
Two recent examples within the Navy highlight the importance of a positive 
military-media relationship, as well as point to ways to make the media a more viable 
asset to the Navy and other U.S. services.  The 1989 explosion onboard USS IOWA (BB-
61), in which 47 sailors lost their lives, showed how being unprepared for dealing with 
the media can prove detrimental to a service’s goals.  A drawn out and biased 
investigation, coupled with efforts to keep the media away from the investigation 
embroiled top Navy officers and irretrievably marred the Navy’s image.  More recently, 
the 2001 collision between the Navy submarine USS GREENEVILLE (SSN 772) and the 
Japanese fishing trawler, Ehime Maru, again illustrated the Navy’s unwillingness to 
embrace the media as its conduit to the public.  The cost of these failures was the loss of 
confidence of the American public in the Navy’s leadership. 
 
B.   1989 USS IOWA EXPLOSION 
On April 19th, 1989, Turret Two, one of the IOWA’s sixteen-inch gun turrets, 
unexpectedly exploded during a routine gunnery exercise.  The ensuing investigation 
carried on for years. After initially casting blame on one of the crewmembers that died in 
the explosion, the Navy eventually accepted the general theory that the explosion 
destroyed much of the evidence and the truth would never be discovered. 
1.   Bringing the Battleships Back 
As part of Navy Secretary John Lehman’s plan for a six hundred-ship navy, the 
four IOWA class battleships were to be re-commissioned and introduced back into the 
Navy’s fleet.76  While many in Congress doubted Lehman’s plan, he assured them that 
the battleships could be brought back into the inventory without much difficulty.  Despite 
their exceptional cost to operate, the battleships offered long range Naval Surface Fire 
Support as well as the new capability of deep strike as a result of the addition to 
Tomahawk missile armored box launchers to her array of armaments. 
                                                 
76 Thompson, Charles C. II.  A Glimpse of Hell: The Explosion on the USS IOWA and Its Cover-Up.  
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc: New York, NY.  1999.  p 138. 
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2.   The Explosion 
On April 19th, 1989, IOWA was operating off of Puerto Rico, when while 
conducting a gunnery exercise, Turret Two suffered a catastrophic explosion, which 
claimed the lives of 47 sailors.  While this paper does not attempt to assert the exact 
cause of the IOWA explosion, but only to highlight the areas in which the media could 
have been used more effectively, the following explanation of the explosion, given by 
Richard L. Schwoebel, who led the Sandia National Laboratory experiments in 
determining the cause of the IOWA disaster, allows for the possibility of any of the 
number of factors that could have caused the explosion. 
It is not possible for anyone outside of the turret to know precisely what is 
happening in the center gun room of Turret Two.  While it was later determined 
that loading of the projectile was normal, something occurred in the loading of the 
powder bags that caused a delay.  Perhaps the inexperienced upper powder hoist 
operator mislocated the powder car and a readjustment was required.  Perhaps the 
new rammerman was confused by the counterintuitive nature of the powder door 
handle and this slowed the loading process.  Perhaps there was a discussion about 
the use of improper propellant with the 2,700 pound projectile.  Perhaps, as the 
Navy came to believe, the gun captain inserted an ignition device instead of the 
lead foils into the propellant train and directed an overram to initiate an 
explosion.77 
 
3.   Covering Up 
The Navy sought, at first, to pin the blame on Navy Petty Officer Second Class 
Clayton Hartwig.  Stating that he was a disgruntled homosexual, the Navy asserted that 
he caused the explosion that killed him and 46 of his shipmates.78  What was not 
immediately brought to light about the incident was the material condition of Turret Two 
prior to the gunnery exercise, nor were the flaws in the investigation following the 
investigation considered by the Navy in determining blame. 
The accident scene was immediately cleaned and repainted, so that as the ship 
returned to Norfolk the public would not be horrified by the sight of the explosion.  Body 
parts were removed from the turret, thereby not allowing an accurate reconstruction of 
                                                 
77 Schwoebel, Richard L.  Explosion Aboard the Iowa.  Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, MD.  1999.  p 6. 
78 Schwoebel, Richard L.  Explosion Aboard the Iowa.  Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, MD.  1999.  p 42. 
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the accident scene.79  All that was left was a shroud of mystery that the Navy hastily 
pinned to the results of one man—Clayton Hartwig. 
When the Navy released its technical report on the cause of the explosion on 
September 7th, 1989, the survivors, Congress, and the family of Clayton Hartwig were 
dissatisfied with the report.  Subsequent hearings were conducted in the House and 
Senate, with the general feeling being that the Navy had rushed to judgment in 
determining that the sole blame for the explosion rested with Hartwig.  Senator William 
Cohen (R-Maine) spoke before the Senate Armed Forces Committee Hearing that 
A possibility was wrapped up by investigators and psychological architects into 
probabilities that were then paraded around as certitudes.  Faulty equipment was 
ruled out, and that left only human error.  Human error took on the dimensions of 
a disturbed and unbalanced young man who murdered forty-six of his 
shipmates.80  
The Navy did not immediately assign the blame to Hartwig.  They explored 
possible accidental causes that might have been the catalyst for the explosion.  However, 
since they were unable to replicate any accidental causes that could trigger the explosion, 
they concluded that there were no accidental causes. 
As mentioned previously, the cause of the accident is not the aim of this chapter, 
missteps with the media is.  The main error committed by the Navy was their rush to 
judgment.  Sandia National Laboratory was unable to determine, for absolute certainty, 
that Clayton Hartwig did or did not insert an ignition device into the powder train on 
April 19th, 1989.81  Subsequently, Congress, the public, and the media, later heavily 
criticized the hasty accusation of Hartwig as the lone conspirator in the explosion. 
4.   Doing It Differently 
The final casualty in this incident was the public’s confidence in the Navy 
leadership to manage the situation.  The Navy should have fed the media reports of the 
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incident and ensuing investigation.  While the labeling of Hartwig as the cause of the 
accident was a result of political infighting between the Navy and Congress, and was the 
ultimate cause of the military-media debacle, much more could have been done to placate 
America’s desire to know the cause of the incident.   
 
C.   2001 USS GREENEVILLE-EHIME MARU COLLISION 
As part of an effort to win the hearts and minds of the American public, the Navy 
often allows distinguished members of the public to venture out on Navy vessels as part 
of a program called ‘Leaders to Sea’.  This program allows prominent members of 
communities across America to see the Navy firsthand, with hopes that they convey their 
good experiences back to their neighbors.  While the one-day excursions rarely take the 
civilians too far away from shore, they are given a brief taste of Navy life as well as the 
opportunity to experience military technology that much of the public only reads about in 
newspapers or news stories on television. 
1.   The Collision 
The GREENEVILLE’s mission on February 9th, 2001, was just that—take a 
group of 14 Texans, who were in Hawaii to participate in a golf tournament to support 
the restoration of the battleship Missouri, out on a day long cruise and “impress them.”82  
After a series of maneuvers, called “angles and dangles”, meant to test the evasive 
capabilities of the ship, the captain of the submarine, CDR Scott Waddle, brought the 
submarine to periscope depth, conducted a brief scan of the ocean’s surface and conferred 
with his fire control technicians to verify that there were no ships or boats in the area, and 
after coming to the conclusion that the surface was clear, he ordered an emergency deep 
maneuver, taking the GREENEVILLE and her guests on a harrowing ride down to 400 
feet below the ocean surface.  To top off the VIPs day and to send them home with a 
lasting impression of the Navy, CDR Waddle ordered an emergency blow of the ships 
main ballast tanks, sending the GREENEVILLE shooting to the surface in just a few 
seconds.  However, a Japanese fishing trawler, the Ehime Maru, carrying with it a group 
of high school students, had came out of the haze around Oahu and into the area in which 
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the GREENEVILLE was operating.  As the GREENEVILLE reached the surface, the 
submarine sliced through the hull of the Ehime Maru, sending most of its crew into the 
Ocean, and nine Japanese to the ocean bottom.83  
2.   The Aftermath 
The ensuing investigation and political wrangling with Japan seemed to overlook 
one thing—the attitudes of the public.  The Navy was quick to act in determining fault for 
the collision; however, given that Japan is a valuable strategic asset, efforts to placate the 
Japanese for their loss were less than stellar. 
Envoys were sent to Japan to offer an apology on behalf of the United States and 
monetary compensation was given to the families of the Ehime Maru victims, but the 
Navy failed to control the situation.  Although the United States understands the cultural 
norm in Japan of offering apology, the liability-conscience nature of the American 
society prevented top officials from allowing CDR Waddle to offer his apologies and 
regrets to the Japanese in a timely manner.  This proved to be the wrong tactic. 
As noted earlier, attitudes are based on available information.  In the absence of 
information from the Navy, public attitudes were shaped by sources with little or no 
factual information about the incident.  The Navy’s reluctance to take a broader role in 
the press coverage of the collision removed important information from the public forum 
and prevented attitudes form being formed with information from both sides of the 
incident.  Media reports were reluctant to term the collision accidental, instead 
insinuating that the GREENEVILLE had recklessly rammed into the Ehime Maru.  Had 
the Navy actively kept the media informed of the details surrounding the collision, the 
media might not have painted such a damning portrait of the situation, and relations 
between the two countries would not have been strained to such a degree.  Not only were 
international relationships strained, once again the American public was given reason to 
doubt the ability of Navy leaders to handle an unfortunate situation.  
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These events were highlighted to show the significance of not dealing-in-good-
faith with the press.  As the premier conduit of information from the military to the 
public, an unwillingness to deal with press can be interpreted as an unwillingness to deal 
with the American public.  The Navy, in its role as a defender of that public, must 
maintain the confidence of the public to conduct its mission.  As shown through the 
IOWA and GREENEVILLE incidents an inability or unwillingness to deal effectively 
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IV.  SURVEY AND EXPERIMENT 
A.   BACKGROUND 
A survey commissioned by the Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation and 
conducted by the Gallup Organization in 1999 as part of the Catigny Conference Series 
polled the American public, one-and two-star officers in the United States military, and 
representatives of the media.  The study showed that considerable bias existed between 
the media and the military and pointed to specific reasons for that bias—with the major 
reasons for bias being that military officers editors and other media “gatekeepers” are 
more interested in selling the news than accurate reporting and that the media, through 
negligence and lack of ethos in their reporting, are a threat to national security and 
military operations—both feelings that are indicative of the low point in the relationship 
between the media and the military that culminated with the Vietnam War.  Since a 
symbiotic relationship would be mutually beneficial to the media and the military, the 
proposed survey as part of this thesis is engineered to extend the military polling to the 
more junior ranks of officers.  Doing so might show a clear, distinct point in an officer's 
career in which biases are developed for or against the media. 
  
B.   THE SURVEY 
In order to make the data collected by the 1999 survey conducted by the Gallup 
Organization relevant to data collected by the proposed survey, the survey detailed in 
Appendix B, has been engineered using the questions that were administered to the 
survey respondents in 1999, as well as some demographic identifying questions.  The 
demographic data will serve to allow the researcher to identify cases of bias based on age, 
rank, gender, educational background, upbringing, commissioning source, and political 
views.  The ultimate goal of this survey is to attempt to pinpoint root causes for military-
media biases and, if they exist, propose methods to mitigate those biases so that a better 




C.   IMPLEMENTING THE SURVEY 
The Survey will be conducted online, hosted on an NPS server, and directed 
towards Unrestricted Line officers (URL) in the United States Navy.  In order to comply 
with NAVPGSCOLINST 3900.4, Protection of Human Subjects, a request, outlined in 
Appendix A, must be submitted to the Institutional Review Board (IRB), along with a 
copy of the intended survey questions listed in Appendix B.   Once approved, the survey, 
entered into an online survey software processing package, will then be hosted on an NPS 
server and invitations sent out to officers in the target group to participate in the survey.   
 
D.   EXPERIMENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
Data will be collected on the NPS server and downloaded to workable formats, 
either in a database or spreadsheet format.  The data can then be analyzed, computing 
averages for responses to questions in which a numerical value had been given and 
observing recurring trends. 
After basic computation of the data, the data can be imported into ARC 
software84 for further analysis.  These experiments should take the responses in which a 
spectrum of answers produced no clear answer on whether or not a bias exists, and decide 
whether or not a split occurs between different values of the demographic data.  For 
example, if a survey question yields the following results: 53% of respondents stated that 
the reason that they are biased against the media is because they have been wronged by 
the media in the past, while 47% of respondents answer the opposite, the data could then 
be examined against the rank demographic and identify when in an officers career media 
training should be implemented. 
The following are suggested comparisons to make between the data sets collected.  
Not all of the questions are represented, but should a data set correlating to a specific 
question stand out, appropriate comparisons to demographic data should be examined. 
                                                 
84 Applied Regression Including Computing and Graphics.  University of Minnesota.  
http://www.stat.umn.edu/arc/ (February 2003)  
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• Questions 8 and 9 (political views) vs. Questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 
and 13 (demographic data) 
• Questions 1,2,4, and 5 (demographics) vs. Question 17 (how well military 
fulfills its role to keep media and public informed) 
• Questions 1,2,4 and 5 (demographics) vs. Questions 18, 19, and 20 (want, 
need, and right to know about military issues and operations) 
• Questions 1,2,4, and 5 (demographics) vs. Question 23 (factors affecting 
officers’ willingness to share information with the media) 
• Questions 1,2,4, and 5 (demographics) vs. Question 25 (media access to 
military) 
• Questions 1,2,4, and 5 (demographics) vs. Question 26 (PAOs role in media-
military relationship) 
• Questions 1,2,4, and 5 (demographics) vs. Question 29 (risks associated with 
talking with media) 
• Questions 1,2,4, and 5 (demographics) vs. Question 31 (consequences 
associated with talking with media) 
• Questions 1,2,4, and 5 (demographics) vs. Question 32 (factors affecting 
media’s ability to inform public) 
• Questions 1,2,4, and 5 (demographics) vs. Question 37 (considerations for 
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APPENDIX A—INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD PACKAGE 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD ROUTE SHEET 
 
Ref:   
Date: March 24, 2003 
 
IRB Committee Member, 
 
You have been selected as an expedited reviewer for the enclosed protocol.  If the 
protocol meets IRB requirements and is not greater than minimal risk, please sign the 
enclosed approval memorandum for the experimental protocol you have reviewed and 
return to the Chair when completed.  Please review this as soon as possible.  We’d like to 
have protocols reviewed within one week of processing.  If this protocol exceeds minimal 
















NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 
 
TO: LCDR Steven J. Iatrou 
 
FROM: LCDR Russell Shilling, Acting Chair, NPS Institutional Review Board for the Protection 
of Human Subjects 
DATE: March 24, 2003 
SUBJ: APPROVAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL 
 
1.  Your protocol entitled “Military-Media Bias Online Survey” has been approved by the 
NPS Institutional Review Board. 
 
2.  You may begin your experiment under the guidelines outlined in your protocol. 
 
3.  This approval will remain active for one year from the above date. However, if there 
are any changes made to your approved protocol over the duration of your data 
collection, it will be necessary to reapply to the NPS IRB for approval. 
 
4.  At the conclusion of data collection, you agree to present a project summary to the 
NPS IRB which will remain on permanent record. 





  Reviewer’s Name and Title 





  LCDR R. Shilling 
IRB Chair 
 





  NPS Approving Official 
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 INFORMATION SCIENCES ACADEMIC GROUP 
Root Hall 
Naval Postgraduate School 






To: Protection of Human Subjects Committee 
 
Subject: Application for Human Subjects Review for Media-Military Relationship 
Online Survey 
 
1. Attached is a list of questions to be administered in an online survey during the month 
of February 2003. 
 
2. We are requesting approval of the described experimental protocol.  
 
3. We include the consent forms and privacy act statements that will be part of the 
navigation process to the URL at which the survey is being hosted. 
  
4. Once a participant completes the survey, no debrief will be given.  Final results will 
be tabulated and analyzed and incorporated into a thesis project exploring the inherent 











APPLICATION FOR  
HUMAN SUBJECTS REVIEW (HSR) 
HSR NUMBER (to be assigned) 
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR(S)  (Full Name, Code, Telephone) 
LCDR Steven J. Iatrou, Code 37/39, 1-831-656-3770 
 
APPROVAL REQUESTED           [X] New          [  ] Renewal 
 
 
LEVEL OF RISK     [  ] Exempt      [  ] Minimal      [X] More than Minimal 
Justification: 
Study only involves completion of online-survey. 
 
WORK WILL BE DONE IN (Site/Bldg/Rm) 
NPS, Root Hall, 201I 
 




MAXIMUM NUMBER OF SUBJECTS 
3000 
 




SPECIAL POPULATIONS THAT WILL BE USED AS SUBJECTS 
[  ] Subordinates    [  ] Minors    [  ] NPS Students    [  ] Special Needs (e.g. Pregnant women) 
[X] Unrestricted Line Officers 
Specify safeguards to avoid undue influence and protect subject’s rights: 
 
SurveySaid software is anonymous.  Only demographic data will be used to annotate data. 
 
OUTSIDE COOPERATING INVESTIGATORS AND AGENCIES 
N/A 
 
[  ] A copy of the cooperating institution’s HSR decision is attached. 
 
TITLE OF EXPERIMENT AND DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH (attach additional sheet if 
needed).  Military-Media Relationship Online Survey.  Survey will attempt to identify a bias 
towards media by military officers and discern if there is a specific time in an officer’s career 
when he/she becomes biased against the media. 
 
I have read and understand NPS Notice on the Protection of Human Subjects. If there are any 
changes in any of the above information or any changes to the attached Protocol, Consent 
Form, or Debriefing Statement, I will suspend the experiment until I obtain new Committee 
approval. 
 
SIGNATURE_________________________________________   DATE_________________
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PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
You are invited to participate in an online survey studying the military and the media.  We 
ask you to read the following paragraphs and press the “Particpate in Survey” button below 
indicating that you agree to be in the study.  Please direct any questions you may have to 
LCDR Steven J. Iatrou, sjiatrou@nps.navy.mil. 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to answer a series of questions 
that are aimed at assessing the relationship between the military and the media amongst the 
Navy’s unrestricted line Officer Corps.  The first 13 questions are for collecting 
demographic information and will aid in the identification of statistical trends, while the 
remaining questions address the military-media relationship. 
 
Privacy Act Statement.  Data collected from this survey will be used for statistical 
analysis by the Principal Investigator, Departments of the Navy and Defense, and other 
U.S. Government agencies, provided this use is compatible with the purpose for which 
the information was collected.  Use of the information may be granted to legitimate non-
government agencies or individuals by the Naval Postgraduate School in accordance with 
the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. 
 
 
1. Risks.  This research involves virtually no risk at all.   
 
2. Compensation.  No tangible reward will be given.  Results will be available in a 
completed thesis project titled, “Military-Media Relationships: Identifying and 
Mitigating Military-Media Biases to Improve Future Military Operations.” 
 
3. Confidentiality.  No information will be gathered which could identify you as a 
participant. 
 
4. Voluntary Nature of the Study.  If you agree to participate, you are free to withdraw 
from the study at any time without prejudice.   
 
5. Minimal Risk Consent Statement.  I understand that this project does not involve 
more than minimal risk.   
 
6. Voluntary Participation.  I understand that my participation in this project is 
voluntary and refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which I 
am otherwise entitled.  I also understand that I may discontinue participation at any 
time without penalty or loss of benefits to which I am otherwise entitled. 
 
7. Statement of Consent.  I have read the above information.  I agree to participate in this 
study. I understand that this project does not involve more than minimal risk.  I have 
been informed of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to me. 
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APPENDIX B—MILITARY MEDIA RELATIONSHIP SURVEY 
QUESTIONS 
Questions 1-13 are designed to provide demographic identifiers to the survey data 
and enable collected data to be correlated to specific age, rank, commissioning 
source, career field, or gender. 
 












2.  What is your primary specialty? 
o Aviator 
o Submariner 
o Surface Warfare Officer 
 
3.  In what year were you born (YYYY format)? 
 
4.  In what year were you commissioned (YYYY format)? 
 




o Enlisted Commissioning Program 
o Seaman to Admiral 
o Other 
 




7.  What is the highest level of education that you have received? 
o high school 
o some college 
o college graduate 
o some graduate work 
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o graduate degree 
 
8.  How would you describe your views on political matters? 
o far left 
o very liberal 
o somewhat liberal 
o moderate 
o somewhat conservative 
o very conservative 
o far right 
o other 
o no opinion 
 
9.  Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, and 




o no preference 
o other 
 
10.  What is the highest level of education that you father obtained? 
o less than high school 
o high school 
o some college 
o college graduate 
o some graduate work 
o graduate degree 
 
11.  What is the highest level of education that your mother obtained? 
o less than high school 
o high school 
o some college 
o college graduate 
o some graduate work 
o graduate degree 
 
12.  Where did you live most of the time when you were growing up? 
o New England 
o South 
o Mountain States 




o moved around 
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o other (please specify) 
 
13.  What is your racial/ethnic identity? 
o White or Caucasian, not Hispanic 
o Hispanic 
o Asian-American 
o Black or African-American, not Hispanic 
o American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut 
o other (please specify) 
 
Questions 14-39 are designed to identify an officer’s feelings towards the role of the 
military in the post—Cold War world and to identify bias towards the media. 
14.  Which of the following do you feel are appropriate roles for the United States 
military to play in contemporary American society.  Choose among 4, “very 
appropriate,” 3, “somewhat appropriate,” 2, “somewhat inappropriate,” and 1, 
“very inappropriate.” 
o Informing the public about military/national security issues 
o Education, training, career opportunities for youth 
o Domestic disaster relief 
o Model for resolution of social problems 
o Enforcement of immigration policies 
o Domestic law enforcement 
 
15.  Which of the following do you feel are appropriate roles for the United States 
military to play in the post-Cold War world.  Choose among 4, “very appropriate,” 
3, “somewhat appropriate,” 2, “somewhat inappropriate,” and 1, “very 
inappropriate.” 
o Protect the U.S. from foreign aggressors 
o Provide military advice to U.S. political leaders 
o Assist in the defense of allies 
o Assist emerging democracies with professionalization and de-politicization of their 
militaries 
o Protect U.S. economic interests abroad 
o Participate in multinational peacekeeping efforts 
o Support humanitarian relief efforts 
o Intervene in civil wars when it is deemed in the U.S. national interest 
o Support and participate in foreign counter-narcotics activities 
 
16.  How well do you think the media keep the public informed about military and 
national security issues? 
o Very well 
o Somewhat well 
o Not very well 
o Not well at all 
o Don’t know 
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17.  How well do you think the military fulfills its responsibility to keep the public 
informed about military and national security issues? 
o Very well 
o Somewhat well 
o Not very well 
o Not well at all 
o Don’t know 
 
18.  Do you want to know about the following issues? 
o Terrorist threats 
o Counter-terrorist activities 
o Military readiness 
o Effect on reaching policy goals 
o Physical damage 
o Human casualties 
o Quality of life 
o Sexual misconduct 
 
19.  Do you feel that you need to know about the following issues? 
o Terrorist threats 
o Counter-terrorist activities 
o Military readiness 
o Effect on reaching policy goals 
o Physical damage 
o Human casualties 
o Quality of life 
o Sexual misconduct 
 
20.  Do you feel that you have a right to know about the following issues? 
o Terrorist threats 
o Counter-terrorist activities 
o Military readiness 
o Effect on reaching policy goals 
o Physical damage 
o Human casualties 
o Quality of life 
o Sexual misconduct 
 
21.  How important do you feel it is for members of the public to receive accurate 
and timely information on military and national security issues and events? 
o Very important 
o Somewhat important 
o Not very important 
o Not important at all 
o Don’t know 
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22.  On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being representing the highest importance rating, 
rate the importance of the following issues affecting the public’s awareness of the 
military. 
o No current military threats to the United States 
o Regional conflicts are far away and too difficult to understand 
o There are more important personal issues to worry about (economy, education, school 
violence) 
o Declining share of Americans have served in the military (lack of personal 
experience) 
o Elimination of the draft 
o Technowar: Battles are being fought with technology, with very few if any U.S. 
casualties 
o Too much on the American plate (lack of time to give the military serious 
consideration) 
o Our current set of role models and heroes are not from the military (all sports and 
entertainment) 
o Because it’s about where they want to be (medium level of interest, therefore medium 
level of awareness) 
o Perceived change in mission of the military from U.S. defense to global peacekeeper 
o U.S. is entertainment oriented society; military events are not entertainment 
o The post-Cold-War message (we won!) 
o Changes in the media (cutbacks in funding, number of reporters, etc.) 
o Lack of serious intellectual debate or challenge coming from the media (not as much 
investigative reporting, detail) 
o Sense that the public feels powerless/disconnected in general (high level of apathy) 
o Impact of negative news stories about the military (sexual misconduct and scandals) 
 
23.  On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being representing the highest importance rating, 
rate the importance of the following issues that (would) affect your willingness to 
share information with the media. 
o Concern about impact on current military operations 
o Lack of general trust in the media by members of the military 
o Fear that comments will be taken out of context and misinterpreted 
o Impact on personal careers (advancement or otherwise) 
o The “good news” offered won’t be published 
o A sense that the story has already been written—media are just looking for a footnote 
or a source 
o A sense that the media don’t truly respect or understand the military’s complexity and 
culture 
o Lead by example (senior officers not going forward on key issues; therefore, junior 
officers continue with this style) 
o Informal mentoring: People who have been burned in the past pass this lesson on to 
new members of the military 
o Personal experience of being burned (I’ve been burned once, I won’t get burned 
again) 
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o Civilian leadership not being visible or encouraging to media access 
o Potential for negative impact on congressional funding efforts 
o Not comfortable with the skill levels to deliver the information and respond to the 
kinds of questions asked 
o Impact on future programs if information in the media precedes procurement 
o No personal benefit or value 
o A level of arrogance that the military “owns” the data 
 
24.  In general, how would you access the Navy’s relation ship with the media.  
Choose among 4, “excellent,” 3, “good,” 2, “fair,” and 1, “poor.” 
 
25.  Should the media have maximum access to the military: 
o In peacetime? 
o During military conflict? 
o When military action is being planned? 
 
26.  Public affairs encourages military officers to speak with reporters: 
o Strongly agree 
o Agree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
 
27.  Public affairs tends to restrict media access to information: 
o Strongly agree 
o Agree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
 
28.  Public affairs tends to follow the orders and desires of senior civilian and 
military leadership in deciding how to approach setting levels of access: 
o Strongly agree 
o Agree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
 
29.  How would you rate the relative risk of speaking with the media in regards to 
the following issues.  Choose among 4, “a very serious risk,” 3, “a fairly serious 
risk,” 2, “not a very serious risk,” and 1, “not a risk at all.” 
o Battle plans or operations 
o Intelligence issues 
o Criticism of current defense or security policies 
o Issues which could embarrass a senior officer 
o Facts contradicting official statement or policies 
o Issues which are the responsibility of superiors 
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o Scandal in the officer’s office or base 
o Sensitive social issues 
o Public policy relating to the military 
o Capabilities of declassified weapons and technology 
o Personnel issues 
o Quality of life issues 
o Basic and advanced training techniques 
 
30.  In speaking with the media, how constrained do you/officers feel due to the 
influence of: (Choose among 4, “a great deal,” 3, “a fair amount,” 2, “not very 
much,” and 1, “not at all.”) 
o Civilian leaders 
o Superior officers 
o Public affairs officers 
o Peers 
 
31.  Rate the following consequences that concern you most when speaking with 
reporters: (Choose among 4, “a very serious concern,” 3, “a fairly serious concern,” 
2, “not a very serious concern,” and 1, “not a concern at all.”) 
o Harming national security 
o Embarrassing your service 
o Putting your career at risk 
o Hurting your chances for promotion 
o Hurting your standing with colleagues 
 
32.  On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being representing the highest importance rating, 
rate the importance of the following factors that you view are affecting the media’s 
ability to inform the public. 
o The current news premium is on sound bites—sensationalism vs. depth 
o The ability to raise the priority of military stories with editors 
o Complexity of military information doesn’t fit the new journalism template/format 
o The level of budget and resource cuts experienced by the media in coverage resources 
for military news and events 
o Lack of general access to military personnel 
o Lack of patience by media to give military time to prepare and analyze 
o Low level of public interest/apathy 
o Too much focus on issues and officers in the Beltway; not enough human-interest 
stories of personal relevance 
o Challenging for the media to assess public interest in a specific regional conflict 
o Concern that the military is trying to spin or control the story (therefore, no news 
might be preferable) 
o Lack of personal military experience by reporters or writers 
o Lack of consistent skills by the military to deliver the information 
o Public’s concern about media accountability in general 
o Military news doesn’t sell newspapers 
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33.  Prior to September 11th, 2001, how do you think the end of the Cold War has 
influenced: 
The assignment of reporters to cover military and security issues? 
o More reporters assigned 
o Same number assigned 
o Fewer assigned 
The level of experience reporters have when covering military and security issues? 
o More experienced 
o About the same 
o Less experienced 
 
34.  Since September 11th, how do you think the United States’ War on Terror has 
influenced: 
The assignment of reporters to cover military and security issues? 
o More reporters assigned 
o Same number assigned 
o Fewer assigned 
The level of experience reporters have when covering military and security issues? 
o More experienced 
o About the same 
o Less experienced 
 
35.  When a reporter wants to do a story on the military or a national security issue, 
it must be approved by an editor or other gatekeeper.  What effect do you think 
editors and gatekeepers have on how fairly and accurately stories get reported? 
o More fair/accurate 
o Just as fair/accurate 
o Less fair/accurate 
 
36.  Do editors and gatekeepers or individual reporters have a greater role in 
determining which military and national security issues get reported in the media? 
o Editors and gatekeepers 
o Reporters 
 
37.  How important are the following considerations to editors and gatekeepers? 
Informing the public: 
o Very important 
o Important 
o Not very important 
o Not important at all 
Selling more copies or getting better ratings: 
o Very important 
o Important 
o Not very important 
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o Not important at all 
 
38.  How has the rise of the 24-hour news television channels and increased 
competition influenced the quality of news reporting of military and security issues? 
o Greatly improved 
o Modestly improved 
o Modestly worsened 
o Greatly worsened 
 
39.  How does the Internet affect the quality of reporting on military and national 
security issues? 
o Improves 
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APPENDIX C—ABC NEWS NIGHTLINE POLL: THE MEDIA IN 
WARTIME 
ABC NEWS NIGHTLINE POLL: THE MEDIA IN WARTIME – 1/12/03 
EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE AFTER 10 p.m. Thursday, Jan. 16, 2003 
 
Public Views of Press Freedom: 
Wartime Changes the Equation 
 
Most Americans support the principle of an unfettered and probing press – but not 
necessarily in wartime. 
 
In general, support for press freedom is broad: Nearly nine in 10 Americans in this ABC 
News Nightline poll say a free press is "very important" or "essential" to them. Most say 
the media should work mainly to question rather than to support government activities. 
And fewer than three in 10 say the government should have power to control what the 
media report. 
 
But wartime raises different concerns. The public by a wide margin says that in times of 
war the need for military secrecy is more important than press freedom. Two-thirds say 











Right to a free press Govt's ability to keep military secrets
More Important in Wartime: 
Free Press, or Military Secrets?
                                                               ABC News Nightline Poll
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information. And most favor a different, less adversarial approach to war coverage by the 
news media themselves.  
 
Such views underscore how many Americans reject an unyielding concept of rights – 
either you have them or you don’t – in favor of a more flexible view of competing 
interests, with priorities dependent on current concerns, and especially, crises. In this 
case, most say that where a free press butts up against the government’s need to keep 
military secrets in wartime, the war effort prevails.  
 
 
This poll was done in support of an ABC News Nightline special, "Viewpoint: 
Patriotism, Journalism and War” airing Friday, Jan. 17 at 11:35 p.m. Eastern time. 
 
Measured independently, it finds, press freedoms and the importance of government 
secrecy in wartime both are seen by large majorities as very important or essential 
concerns. But somewhat more call military secrecy in wartime "essential" – 49 percent, 
compared to 38 percent who call press freedoms essential. And when the two are 
matched head on, Americans by 60-34 percent say the government's ability to keep 
wartime secrets is more important than the right to a free press. 
 
    Which is more important: 
       The right to a free press                                     34% 
       The govt’s ability to keep military secrets in wartime 60% 
 
 
These views are premised on the special concerns associated with wartime. Outside of 
war, just 25 percent say the media's main obligation is to support what the government 
does; far more, 58 percent, say it's to question government activities (and 13 percent say 
it depends on the subject).  
 
Similarly, 28 percent say that in general the government should have the right to control 
what information the media report, while again 58 percent oppose such constraints (and 
again 13 percent say it depends on the subject matter). 
 
But in wartime these views change sharply. Fifty-six percent say the media is more 
obliged to support than to question how the government carries out a war. And by 66-31 
percent the public says the government should have the right to prohibit media disclosure 
of military secrets. 
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In general, media should mainly 
Support the gov’t  25% 
Question the gov’t             58% 
Depends on subject             13% 
 
In wartime, media should mainly 
Support govt’s war effort       56% 
Question govt’s war effort      36% 
 
Other polling has also shown the extent to which the public takes a flexible view of 
constitutional rights. Last year the organization Public Agenda found that Americans by a 
3-1 margin said constitutional rights are not “complete and absolute,” but instead come 
with “limits and responsibilities.” And by 62-35 percent respondents said these rights 
were not meant never to change, but “were meant to change with the times.” Separately, a 
review of decades of past polling, by Robert J. Blendon and John M. Benson of Harvard 
University, found that public attitudes tend to swing away from unfettered rights in times 


























The Role of the News Media
                                                 ABC News Nightline poll
In general… In wartime...
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HOW NOW – The news media get good marks for their current performance. In covering 
the possibility of war with Iraq, just 13 percent say the media have been too supportive of 
the Bush administration, and 17 percent say they’ve been too critical; rather, 61 percent 
say the media’s approach has been “about right” in balance. Views on coverage of the 
war on terrorism are very similar. 
 Too supportive of 
Bush admin. 
Too critical of Bush 
administration About right 
Media coverage of 
the war on terrorism 19% 15% 60% 
Media coverage of 
possible war with 
Iraq 
13% 17% 61% 
 
PARTISANSHIP – There are partisan differences in these results. In the largest, 
Republicans are much more apt to say the government’s ability to keep military secrets in 
wartime is “essential” – 65 percent of Republicans say so, compared to 47 percent of 
independents and 38 percent of Democrats. It follows that Republicans are more apt to 
say that keeping military secrets is more important than ensuring press freedom in 
wartime – 76 percent of Republicans say so, compared to 55 percent of Democrats (still a 
majority) and 52 percent of independents. 
 
Republicans also are less apt to say the media should be more questioning rather than 
supportive in their relationship with government – 44 percent of Republicans hold that 
view, compared to 67 percent of Democrats and six in 10 independents. And Republicans 
are more apt to say the media have been too critical of the administration in covering the 
situation with Iraq – but even among Republicans, just one-third hold this view.  
 
 More important: 
 Right to a free press Military secrets in wartime 
Republicans 19% 76% 
Democrats 41% 55% 
Independents 42% 52% 
 
 Media should mainly: 
 Support the gov’t Question the gov’t 
Republicans 39% 44% 
Democrats 22% 67% 
Independents 16% 61% 
 
 
There are also regional and racial differences; Westerners, blacks and other nonwhites are 




METHODOLOGY - This ABC News Nightline survey was conducted by telephone Jan. 
8-12, 2003, among a random national sample of 1,037 adults. The results have a three-
point error margin. Sampling, data collection and tabulation by TNS Intersearch of 
Horsham, Pa. 
 
Analysis by Gary Langer. 
 
ABC News polls can be found at ABCNEWS.com on the Internet at: 
http://www.abcnews.com/sections/us/PollVault/PollVault.html  
 
Media Contact: Cathie Levine, (212) 456-4934 
 
Full results follow.  
 
1. How important to you is the right to a free press in this country - would you say it’s 
essential, very important, somewhat important or not especially important? 
 
 Essential Very important 
Somewhat 
important 




1/12/03 38% 49% 10% 3% 1% 
 
2. In general, do you think the news media have more of an obligation to (support what 
the government does), or more of an obligation to (question what the government does)?  
 
 Support Question Depends on the subject (vol.) No opinion 
1/12/03 25% 58% 13% 1% 
 
3. In general, do you think the government should or should not have the right to control 
what information the news media can report?  
 Should Should not Depends on the subject (vol.) No opinion 
1/12/03 28% 58% 13% 1% 
 
4. How important to you is the government's ability to keep military secrets in wartime - 
would you say it’s essential, very important, somewhat important or not especially 
important? 
 Essential Very important 
Somewhat 
important 




1/12/03 49% 34% 13% 4% 1% 
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5. If you had to pick, which of these would you say is more important - (the right to a free 
press in this country) or (the government’s ability to keep military secrets in wartime)? 
 
 Right to a free press 
Government’s ability to keep   
military secrets in wartime No opinion 
1/12/03 34% 60% 6% 
 
6. Specifically in a time of war, do you think the news media have more of an obligation 
to (support how the government carries out the war) or more of an obligation to (question 
how the government carries out the war)? 
 
 Support Question No opinion 
1/12/03      56% 36% 8% 
 
7. Again, specifically in time of war, do you think the government should or should not 
have the right to prohibit the news media from reporting sensitive military information? 
 
 Should Should not    No opinion 
1/12/03 66% 31% 4% 
 
8a. (HALF SAMPLE) In covering the war on terrorism, do you think the news media 
have been (too supportive) of the Bush administration, (too critical) of the Bush 
administration, or about right? 
 
 Too supportive   Too critical    About right    No opinion 
1/12/03 19% 15% 60% 6% 
 
8b. (OTHER HALF) In covering the possibility of war with Iraq, do you think the news 
media have been (too supportive) of the Bush administration, (too critical) of the Bush 
administration, or about right? 
 
 Too supportive Too critical About right No opinion 
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